An offline-first, end-to-end encrypted password manager.
No account, no server and no Internet connection required. Sync is optional and explicit.
Warning
QuickVault is pre-1.0 and under active development. File and wire formats may still change, and the code has not been independently audited. Don't keep your only copy of important secrets in it yet.
- Why QuickVault
- Features
- Screenshots
- Getting started
- Command-line client
- Syncing between devices
- Security design
- Architecture
- Project status
- Contributing
- License
Most password managers assume an account and a cloud. QuickVault starts from the other end: a complete vault is a single encrypted file on your device, and everything works with the network unplugged. When you want your secrets on another device, you sync directly over your local network by scanning a one-use QR code. No account, no relay and nothing stored about the other device. A self-hosted remote-sync server was designed (as untrusted storage that only ever sees ciphertext) but is not planned for now.
- Offline is the default, not a fallback. Reads and edits never wait for the network, and nothing depends on an account or a server.
- One UI everywhere. The same app runs on Linux, Android and Windows and adapts from a three-pane desktop layout down to a phone.
- Edits are never silently lost. Concurrent edits from different devices are kept whole and shown as conflicts for you to resolve, and every change is kept in history.
- Specs first. Behaviour is defined in normative specifications before it's implemented, including the threat model.
| 🔐 Encrypted vault | One SQLite file of encrypted objects. Argon2id key derivation, XChaCha20-Poly1305, an authenticated manifest and rollback anchors. |
| 🗂️ Organize | Nested groups; logins, secure notes, cards, Wi-Fi networks and custom items; custom fields; colors; fast full search over non-secret fields. |
| 📎 Attachments | Files stored in encrypted, padded 64 KiB chunks, with in-memory previews for images and media. |
| ⏱️ TOTP | Built-in one-time codes for two-factor logins. |
| 🎲 Generator | Random passwords and word passphrases with strength estimates. |
| 🕓 History & recovery | Every edit kept in history; trash; local snapshots; 24-word recovery phrase; key rotation; a full verify pass. |
| 🔄 LAN sync | Peer-to-peer over the local network with one-use QR or typed codes. Post-quantum hybrid key exchange (X-Wing). |
| ⚖️ Conflicts | Causal, whole-record merging. Concurrent versions stay intact until you pick one. |
| 📦 Archives | Authenticated encrypted archives for backups, or for exchanging a vault through Syncthing, Dropbox or a USB stick. |
| 📱 Android | Fingerprint quick unlock backed by hardware keys, exact-match autofill, in-app QR scanner, FLAG_SECURE. |
| 🧹 Secret hygiene | Secrets held in zeroizing containers, clipboard cleared after 20 s, reveal times out after 30 s, auto-lock after 60 s idle or on screen lock. |
| ⌨️ CLI | qv, a full scriptable client for the same vaults, with JSON output. |
Sidebar, item list and item details under QuickVault's own title bar.
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| Light theme, card item | Password generator |
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| Lock screen | LAN sync: no account, no server |
The same UI at phone width, with bottom tabs. Wi-Fi items show a QR code other phones can scan to join.
All screenshots show a throwaway demo vault filled with made-up data.
QuickVault is built from source for now; there are no release packages yet.
-
Rust. The toolchain is pinned in
rust-toolchain.toml(1.98.1) andrustuppicks it up automatically. -
Linux desktop app: GTK 3, WebKitGTK 4.1, libxdo and the AppIndicator development libraries. For example, on Debian or Ubuntu:
sudo apt install libgtk-3-dev libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev libxdo-dev libayatana-appindicator3-dev
git clone https://github.com/rdbo/quickvault.git
cd quickvault
# Desktop app (Linux; Windows uses WebView2)
cargo run --locked --release -p qv-app --features desktop --bin quickvault
# Command-line client
cargo install --locked --path crates/qv-cli # installs `qv`Create a vault from the welcome screen by giving it a name and a master password. The app then shows your 24-word recovery phrase. Write it down: it's the only way back in if you forget the master password.
Vaults are stored in ~/.local/share/quickvault/vaults and private app
state in $XDG_STATE_HOME/quickvault (%LOCALAPPDATA%\QuickVault on
Windows).
Android (arm64, API 29+) builds use a pinned SDK/NDK recipe, JDK 21 and the Dioxus CLI 0.7.10:
sh scripts/setup-android.sh --accept-licenses
eval "$(sh scripts/setup-android.sh --print-env)"
sh crates/qv-app/scripts/build-android.sh # APKs land in crates/qv-app/dist/See crates/qv-app/README.md for platform details,
quick unlock, autofill and the validation tooling.
qv works on the same vault files as the app. Secrets are never taken as
arguments or environment variables: they're prompted for without echo,
generated, or (for the master password only) read with --password-stdin.
$ qv init ~/vaults/personal.qvault --name Personal
$ export QVAULT_PATH=~/vaults/personal.qvault
$ qv add Email/Proton --username alice@example.com --url https://proton.me --generate
$ qv ls -r
$ qv search proton
$ qv show Email/Proton
$ qv copy Email/Proton # copied; cleared after 20 seconds
$ qv totp Email/Proton
$ qv history Email/Proton
$ qv snapshot ls
$ qv verifyRun qv --help or qv <command> --help for everything else: groups, trash,
attachments, conflicts, archive export and merge, password change, recovery
and key rotation. The full reference is spec 0011.
Sync is always something you start; nothing happens in the background.
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant A as Device A
participant B as Device B
A->>A: Sync → "Show a code"<br/>(one-use, valid 10 minutes)
B->>A: Scan the QR, or type the 26-character code
Note over A,B: Hybrid X-Wing handshake, then both sides<br/>prove they hold the vault key
A-->>B: Exchange missing encrypted records, both ways
Note over A,B: The code is spent. Neither device<br/>stores anything about the other.
- Sync two copies of the same vault:
qv lan openon one device,qv lan syncon the other, or Show a code / Scan a code in the app. - Add a new device with
qv lan join --new, or Join from another device on the app's lock screen. The new device proves itself with the vault password (both screens show a comparison code) or with the recovery words. - Without a network, export an encrypted archive and merge it on the other device. Archives open only with the vault key and are authenticated before anything parses them.
QuickVault's threat model assumes stolen vault files, hostile networks, malicious sync peers and an untrusted server. In brief:
- Key hierarchy. Your master password (Argon2id) or recovery phrase unwraps a random vault key. Key derivation, data encryption, wrapping and signature profiles are versioned independently, so each can evolve without migrating the others (spec 0002).
- Authenticate before parsing. Every record, manifest and archive is authenticated before it's decoded. Untrusted input is size-bounded before allocation, and attacker-supplied files never reach the SQLite parser (spec 0004).
- Rollback detection. An authenticated manifest covers every live version, retained history and tombstone, and a per-device anchor detects a vault file that has been swapped for an older copy.
- Post-quantum ready. LAN sync uses X-Wing (X25519 + ML-KEM-768). The (not planned) remote-sync design adds Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures and hybrid TLS.
- Memory hygiene. Application secrets live in zeroizing containers, are never logged or put in error messages, and core dumps are disabled. Webview and OS copies are cleaned up on a best-effort basis, and the limits are documented (spec 0008).
- No home-made cryptography. Only reviewed crates, pinned exactly.
Dependencies are checked with
cargo denyandcargo vet, and decoders are fuzzed weekly in CI.
Note
A written spec or a passing test suite doesn't prove that something is secure. The release gates in spec 0012, including independent review of the sync protocols, are still open.
QuickVault is a Cargo workspace of small crates. Frontends talk only to
qv-core, and the cryptography and data model never depend on a frontend.
flowchart TD
app["<b>qv-app</b><br/>Dioxus UI · Linux / Android / Windows"]
cli["<b>qv-cli</b><br/>the qv command"]
core["<b>qv-core</b><br/>sessions · authorization · search · policy"]
sync["<b>qv-sync</b><br/>causal merge · LAN sync"]
store["<b>qv-store</b><br/>hardened SQLite · manifests · archives"]
model["<b>qv-model</b><br/>records · version vectors · TOTP"]
protocol["<b>qv-protocol</b><br/>bounded wire messages"]
crypto["<b>qv-crypto</b><br/>keys · AEAD · KDF · X-Wing · zeroizing memory"]
platform["<b>qv-platform</b><br/>clipboard · lock signals · file pickers · keystore"]
win["<b>qv-win</b><br/>Win32 bindings"]
encoding["<b>qv-encoding</b><br/>deterministic bounded CBOR"]
app --> core
cli --> core
core --> sync
core --> store
core --> platform
sync --> store
sync --> protocol
store --> model
store --> crypto
model --> crypto
protocol --> encoding
crypto --> encoding
platform -.-> win
| Crate | Role |
|---|---|
qv-encoding |
Bounded, deterministic CBOR; validates hostile input before typed reads |
qv-crypto |
Crypto profiles, key hierarchy, protected memory, password generator, LAN handshake keys |
qv-model |
Records and payloads, version vectors, merge, group tree, TOTP |
qv-store |
The hardened vault file, encrypted objects, manifests, anchors, archives, verify |
qv-protocol |
Key-free LAN wire format: frames, messages, QR and code formats |
qv-sync |
Causal merge candidates and the LAN sync exchange over TCP |
qv-core |
Sessions, locking, mutation authorization, search index, snapshots, sync windows |
qv-platform |
OS adapters: clipboard, lock/sleep signals, file pickers, Android keystore |
qv-win |
Windows-only Win32 FFI; the only crate allowed unsafe |
qv-cli |
The qv command-line client |
qv-app |
The shared Dioxus app for desktop and phone |
ARCHITECTURE.md covers trust boundaries, the key
lifecycle and the main flows in depth.
| Phase | Scope | State |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Offline core, encrypted vault, history and recovery, Linux CLI | ✅ Done |
| 2 | Linux and Android apps, LAN sync, conflicts, archive exchange | 🚧 Implemented; device validation and owner review in progress |
| 3 | Windows | 🚧 Implemented; Windows gate evidence pending |
| 4 | Optional self-hosted server and remote sync | ⏸️ Not planned (design kept in the specs) |
| Later | Automatic sync, import/export from other managers, iOS/macOS, browser extension | 💭 Future |
The detailed roadmap is in plans/0002-roadmap
and changes are listed in CHANGELOG.md. What remains before
1.0 (offline vault plus LAN sync on Linux, Android and Windows) is tracked in
plan 0056.
QuickVault is developed spec-first:
-
Specs are normative. A behaviour change starts as an amendment in
specs/. -
Plans before code. Non-trivial work gets a plan in
plans/. Cryptography, storage or wire formats, protocols and secret handling go through design, implementation and an independent review. -
Every change passes the gates:
sh scripts/check-spdx.sh cargo fmt --check cargo clippy --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings cargo test --lockedThe app's UI code also needs
--features desktop(orvalidation) for Clippy and tests. Dependency changes also runcargo deny checkandcargo vet --locked.
Every source file starts with // SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later.
unsafe is forbidden outside qv-win, and unwrap/expect/panic! are
denied outside tests. Read AGENTS.md for the full
contributor workflow.
QuickVault is free software, licensed under the
GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 or later.
The vendored dioxus-desktop fork under third-party/
keeps its upstream MIT/Apache-2.0 license.



